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Among the many disturbing labor market trends in recent years,
the stagnation in the racial wage gap may be the most disheartening. 
Race remains America’s most persistent social and economic disparity. 
Many Americans had been encouraged by the steady and significant black
economic progress since the second world war.  The recent stagnation
challenges that optimism. Similarly, the average economic status of
Latinos appears to be deteriorating at an even more alarming rate than
that of African-Americans. 
This paper describes the major trends that have impacted on the
economic position of African-Americans and Latinos.  In addition to
long term trends which appear to be influenced mostly by skill related
factors, I also evaluate alternative explanations for the recent
stagnation in the economic position of minority households. These
explanations include changing schooling, quality of students,
affirmative action, and rising wage inequality.  In addition, the
unique role of immigration in altering the labor market position of
Latino workers is analyzed.
This paper is organized into five sections.  Section 1 summarizes
long-term trends in the relative economic status of African-Americans
and Latinos primarily using data obtained from the decennial U.S.
Censuses. The next section examines in some detail more recent trends
across the last three decades using data from the yearly March Current
Population Surveys (CPS).  The third section attempts to summarize the
evidence concerning the major forces that have been put forth as     
1This section updates Smith-Welch (1989) on long-term racial trends.
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primary candidates for explaining these trends. These forces include
schooling, affirmative action enforcement, and structural changes in
the labor market.  Section 4 presents evidence on three special
immigration related issues that impact on the labor market performance
of Hispanics--labor market quality, life-cycle assimilation, and
generational assimilation.  While most comparisons of relative
economic status rely on income or wages, there are other equally
relevant indices of economic resources.  One of these measures is
examined in section 5 which provides data on racial differences in
household wealth.
Section 1- Long-Term Wage Trends
Since 1940, the American economy has enjoyed substantial economic
growth, and inflation adjusted incomes of all its citizens have risen
dramatically.  For example, real incomes of white men expanded almost
three-fold between 1940 and 1990.  But this improvement was surpassed
by even more rapid earnings growth among black men whose real incomes
more than quadrupled over these 50 years.
1  Not only did the standard
of living of black men improved as measured against earlier Black
generations, it rose relative to their white contemporaries.
Table 1 points to a very impressive rise in the relative economic
status of black men over this 50 year time span.  In 1940, the typical
black male worker earned only 43 percent as much as his white3
counterpart.  By 1990, the average black man in the labor force earned
75 percent as much as the typical white man.
The pace at which blacks were able to narrow the wage gap was far
from uniform. The largest improvement occurred in the 1940s, but
advances slowed considerably during the 1950s, when the narrowing of
racial wage disparities was modest.  The years after 1960 signaled a
return to more rapid wage growth among black men.  During both the
1960s and 1970s, the rise in black wages was more than 10 percent
higher than for whites.  After 1980, the pace of relative black labor
market progress slowed considerably, a topic to which I return below.
Table 1
Minority Male Wages as a Percent of White Male Wages
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Minority  Group             1940    1950    1960    1970    1980    1990
_________________________________________________________________________
Blacks                      43.3    55.2    57.5    64.4    72.6    74.5
All Hispanics               64.2    73.8    70.2    73.7    70.7    67.3
Mexicans                    55.6    71.3    70.0    70.1    68.0    63.0
Puerto Ricans               82.9    71.5    61.3    66.7    66.1    74.5
Cubans                      n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    75.6    82.8    86.6
Other Hispanics             82.1    85.4    82.3    82.7    77.6    71.9
Blacks as a percent 
  of Hispanics              67.4    74.8    81.9    87.4    1.03    1.07
___________________________________________________________________
The extent of the improvement in the relative economic status of
blacks over these 50 years is impressive.  However, even in 1990,
black male incomes still significantly lagged behind those of whites. 
This last half century description of racial income differences has4
two messages. The first part of the story emphasizes that considerable
progress has been made in eradicating the wage gap between the races. 
The second part recognizes that even this progress has not eliminated
race as an important predicator of an individual's income.
 Table 1 also points to a remarkably constant Hispanic wage gap
over the last 50 years.  In 1990, for every dollar native white men
earn, Latinos receive 67 cents, only slightly higher than the wage gap
of 1940.  This aggregate stability, however, hides important changes
over time.  For example, since 1970 there has been a steady
deterioration in the relative economic status of Latinos as their
wages fell by 16 percent compared to white men. 
The lack of Hispanic economic progress is most apparent when
compared to blacks in the last line of Table 1.  Sixty years ago,
black men earned two-thirds as much as the average Latino worker. In
1990, blacks actually out earn Hispanics by 7 percent. One tale of
these two minorities is the significant progress achieved by black men
over the last half century.  No such story of progress seems possible
for Latinos, who seem over the long term to have stagnated and, in
recent years, to have deteriorated.  This sharp contrast between
Hispanics and blacks suggests that forces unique to Hispanics-their
immigrant status or their language may have played a central role.  
While often lumped together into one class, there has always been
considerable economic heterogeneity within the Latino population. 
Among the major Latino subgroups, Mexicans have always fared the worse     
2From the first attempts to measure poverty, debate has continued on
whether poverty is an absolute or relative concept.  To count the
poverty population, I have adopted a middle ground using elements of
both absolute and relative definitions.  It turns out that my
definition also corresponds more closely to people's notions of what
poverty means.  When asked in surveys over time about the income
required not to be poor, the poverty threshold has increased roughly
fifty cents by every dollar increase in real income.  Based on that
observation, my definition of poverty increases the poverty threshold
income by half a percent for every one percent growth in real income. 
The setting of the initial poverty threshold is arbitrary.  I
selected as the initial criteria an income level such that 11 percent
of white male earnings were poor in 1979.  This poverty threshold was
then adjusted for any real income growth or contraction relative to
that year.  My definition of the elite is asymmetric.  To be a member
of the elite, one must have a income of 4/3 of the white median in
that year.  See Smith-Welch (1989) for details.
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economically.  In 1940, while the other Hispanic ethnic groups were
being paid more than eighty cents on the dollar compared to a native
white man, Mexican men were earning only 56 percent of white men. 
During the 1940s, wages of Mexican men rose sharply relative to the
white male majority.  By 1950, the Mexican wage gap was 71 percent, a
ratio to which it stayed anchored for the next 20 years.  After 1970,
however, Mexican relative wages declined steadily, expanding their
wage disparity to its highest level in over 40 years. 
The Poor, the Affluent and the Middle Class
 The issue of the distribution of this long-term labor market
progress is addressed in Table 2.  Building on the simplicity of the
poverty line,  I divided all workers into three wage classes--
poor,middle class, and affluent.
2  Using this simple three-way     
3Between 1940 and 1970, median white wages grew by 3.2 percent per
year, a growth that was fairly uniform across the wage distribution.
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division, we can track overall labor market trends with white men as
our benchmark. 
 Coming out of the depression, 31 percent of working white men
had jobs that placed them in poverty in 1940. But the situation for
Blacks and Latinos was far worse.  In 1940, by any definition, the
overwhelming majority of blacks were poor. Three quarters were
destitute, with little hope that their lot or even that of their
children would soon improve.  The small black middle class in 1940
comprised only one in five black men.  At the other extreme, the
economic elite resembled an exclusive white club. Similarly, more than
half of Latino men in 1940 worked in jobs that confined them within
the ranks of the poor, and only one in three earned middle class
wages.  Among Latinos, Mexicans fared the worst.  Almost two-thirds of
working Mexican men earned wages below the poverty threshold.
The subsequent changes have been dramatic.  Driven by economic
growth and improvements in the skills of the workforce, poverty rates
declined rapidly for the white male majority,
3 until only one in every
11 white workers fell below the poverty threshold in 1970.  And almost
two in every three white male workers earned middle class incomes. 
Unfortunately, this historic trend reversed during the 1970s and
1980s.  The stagnant economic conditions of those decades combined 7
Table 2
Income Group Status of Male Workers
___________________________________________________________________________
                         1940     1950     1960     1970     1980     1990
___________________________________________________________________________
White Men
 Poor                     31       18       13        9       11       12
 Middle Class             38       59       63       65       61       60
 Affluent                 31       23       24       26       28       28
Black Men
 Poor                     74       44       37       25       20       23
 Middle Class             22       51       58       68       67       64
 Affluent                  4        5        5        7       13       13
Hispanic Men
 Poor                     57       32       27       17       23       27
 Middle Class             34       61       66       75       66       62
 Affluent                  9        7        7        8       11       11
Mexican Men
 Poor                     63       37       29       21       24       30
 Middle Class             31       57       64       70       65       60
 Affluent                  6        6        7        9       11       10
Puerto Rican Men 
 Poor                     33       23       27       15       21       18
 Middle Class             49       71       70       80       70       69
 Affluent                 18        6        3        5        9       13
Other Hispanics 
 Poor                     45       19       18       13       21       24
 Middle Class             40       68       70       73       64       63
 Affluent                 15       13       12       14       15       13
___________________________________________________________________________
with expanding wage inequality led both to an increase in both the
fraction of white men who were poor and those who were affluent.
The real story of these 50 years was the emergence of the black
and Latino middle class, whose income gains were real and substantial. 
The growth in the size of the black middle class has been so8
spectacular that as a group it outnumbers the black poor.  By 1990,
about two-thirds of blacks and Latinos had incomes that met the
criteria for middle class. In addition, the odds of a black man
penetrating the ranks of the economic elite trebled. Unfortunately,
as was true for the white majority, these gains in poverty reduction
reversed (at a more rapid rate) in recent years for the two minority
groups.  Since 1980, there was more than a 10% increase in the
relative numbers of Black and Latino working men. These more recent
trends are examined in more detail below.
Trends in Education
A basic index of the skill workers bring with them to the labor
market is the number of years of schooling completed.  Because Blacks
and Latinos differ from other workers in their schooling, education
should play a central role in explaining both levels and trends in
their wage gaps.  It does. The A panels of Table 3 list mean years of
schooling completed for each of the major male demographic groups.  To
highlight differences between the groups, the B panels of this table
summarize education deficits of each group compared to white men. 
Not surprisingly, among all groups, education levels of each new
generation increased over these 50 years.  While this secular
improvement exists for men of both races, Table 3 demonstrates that it
was much sharper among black men.  Educational differences still
persist between the races, but they are far less today than at any     
4See Smith-Welch (1989) for a detailed analysis.
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time our history.  In 1990, the typical black male had 1.1 years less
schooling than the average white male.  This education deficit
represented a steady and continuous decline from the racial difference
of 3.7 years in 1940.  Since 1940, almost three-quarters of the




Education Levels of Males
_______________________________________________________________________
Calendar                                       Puerto           Other
  Year       White   Black  Hispanic  Mexican  Rican    Cuban  Hispanic
_______________________________________________________________________
A.  Average Education Levels of Males
  1990       13.30   12.19    10.57    9.97    11.37    12.28   11.45
  1980       12.76   11.37    10.18    9.57    10.09    11.72   11.37
  1970       11.84    9.82     9.52    8.76     8.92    10.75   10.82
  1960       10.37    7.54     7.88    7.34     7.77     n.a.    9.94
  1950       10.23    6.71     6.61    6.08     7.73     n.a.    8.07
  1940        9.48    5.74     5.95    5.34     7.95     n.a.    7.15
B.  Education Deficits Compared to White Men
  1990        -0-     1.11     2.73    3.33     1.93     1.02    1.85
  1980        -0-     1.39     2.58    3.19     2.67     1.04    1.39
  1970        -0-     2.02     2.32    3.08     2.92     1.35    1.02
  1960        -0-     2.83     2.49    3.03     2.60     n.a.    0.43
  1950        -0-     3.52     3.62    4.15     2.50     n.a.    2.16
  1940        -0-     3.74     3.53    4.14     1.53     n.a.    2.33
_______________________________________________________________________
The rate of secular improvement in Latino schooling was far
smaller and more uneven.  While black men erased three quarters of
their educational disparity with white men, Latinos were able to     
5 The cutoff point used to define recent immigrants is whether their
arrival into the United States took place within the last five years. 
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eliminate only 27 percent of their initial 1940 deficit.  In the
process, their education ranking was reversed. Hispanics had a lead of
one-fifth of a year of schooling over black men in 1940; by 1990,
black men had more than an one and one-half year schooling advantage.
The 1990 Hispanic education gap with white men was nearly two and a
half times as large as the racial schooling gap in that year.
To understand reasons for these disparities, it is necessary to
distinguish among Latinos those who are immigrants and those who are
native-born. Since immigrants’ schooling is much less than that of
native-born, secular trends in schooling can be quite sensitive to
swings in the size of immigration flows. Some insight into the central
role of immigration is available from Table 4 which lists Hispanic
education levels (and their deficits with whites) by nativity and, for
the foreign-born, by whether they were recent immigrants or not.
5
Table 4 indicates that the changing composition of recent
immigration alongside the increasing fraction of immigrants within the
Latino population are two dominant underlying trends.  Given the
better educational opportunities available in the United States
compared to those in their home countries, it is not a surprise that
native-born men have more schooling than their foreign-born
counterparts.  However, the different secular trends for the native
and foreign born are more surprising. Throughout the last half     
6Similar trends exist all Latino groups and especially for the
numerically important Mexican sub-population.
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century, the education disparity between native born Hispanics and
native born whites steadily narrowed.  In 1940, native-born white men
had a 3.3 year schooling advantage compared to U.S.-born Hispanics. 
By 1990, 60 percent of this deficit had been eliminated, and U.S. born
Hispanics trailed white men by 1.3 years.
6 
A far different picture emerges among the foreign born.  Not only
are their disparities with white men considerably larger, there is no
longer a story of uniform progress.  In particular, since 1970, the
era of reversal in the aggregate data, the education gap for
foreign-born men increased significantly.  Indeed, the mean education
of foreign-born Hispanic men is little higher now than it was in 1970. 
Compared to native whites, the education deficit of foreign-born
Hispanic workers rose from 2.58 to 3.77 years, a relative
deterioration of more than one year over the last two decades. 
 The force of these changes is most apparent among recent
immigrants, who represent a better index of the education of newly
arriving immigrants.  During the last 50 years, there has been a
steady deterioration in the relative education of new Latino
immigrants. In 1940, new Latino immigrants trailed native white men by
1.3 years; by 1990,the education deficit had risen to 4.3 years.  The
increase in the education deficits of recent immigrants has
accelerated since 1970.12
Table 4
Male Hispanic Years of Schooling Completed, by Nativity
_________________________________________________________________________
                       1990     1980     1970     1960     1950     1940
_________________________________________________________________________
A. Average Education Levels of Males
All Hispanics         10.57    10.18     9.37     7.88     6.61     5.95
  U.S. born           11.98    10.93     9.80     8.18     7.04     6.18
  Foreign born         9.36     9.24     9.26     7.17     5.24     5.27
  1-5 years    
   in U.S.             8.96     8.36     9.13     8.47     n.a.     8.21
  6 or more    
   years in    
   U.S.                9.50     9.56     9.33     6.75     n.a.     5.23
B. Education Deficits Compared to White Men
All Hispanics          2.66     2.49     2.47     2.49     3.62     3.53
  U.S. born            1.25     1.74     2.04     2.19     3.19     3.30
  Foreign born         3.77     3.43     2.58     3.20     4.99     4.21
  1-5 years   
     in U.S.           4.27     4.31     2.71     1.90     n.a.     1.27
  6 or more   
    years   
    in U.S.            3.73     3.11     2.51     3.62     n.a.     4.25
__________________________________________________________________________
In sum, the slow rate of Hispanic educational progress largely
reflects a changing composition of the immigrant workforce.  First,
the rising fraction of immigrants in the Hispanic male work force in
recent decades slowed the aggregate gains in Hispanic schooling (since
the foreign born have less schooling than U.S.-born Hispanic).
Increasing numbers of poorly educated Mexicans among Hispanic
immigrants also served to lower the schooling advances achieved.
The aggregate education data for all Latinos raised an important
puzzle that dis-aggregation by nativity has resolved.  The puzzle was13
best highlighted by a comparison of their limited education gains with
the substantial gains achieved by blacks over the last 50 years. If we
limit our comparison to blacks and native born Latinos, the puzzle
disappears. Both groups now show a substantial narrowing of their
education deficits with white men.  Latinos born here seem no less
able than blacks to improve their educational position over time.
Section 2-Recent Labor-Market Wage Trends
In a number of important ways, the long run historical trends
depicted above did not continue during the last 25 years.  In this
section, trends in weekly wages by year, race, ethnicity and gender
from the 1960s to the present are examined using the yearly March
Current Population Surveys starting in 1962.
To set an overall context, Fig. 1 includes yearly trends in mean
inflation adjusted weekly wages among working white men. Since they
remain the ‘majority’ group in the labor market, white men provide an
index of what was happening to average wages. As an approximation,
secular trends can be separated into three periods. 1962-1973 were
years of real wage growth (1.6 % per year). Then followed, a sharp
decline until 1981 when the average real wage of white men fell by 14
percent.  This fall was so steep that real wages in 1981 were only 3
percent higher than in 1962.  Fortunately, the years since 1981 were
ones of recovery with real wages of white men in 1996 15% higher than
at the 1981 trough (1% per year growth).     
7CPS identification of Hispanic ethnicity began in 1971.
     
8If we examine Mexicans alone, the trends are similar except that the
wage gap is about 5-8% larger than that observed for all Hispanics.
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Time series trends for other groups will in the first instance
mimic these trends among white men. However, our interest here centers
mainly on departures from the white male series. These departures are
best captured in Figure 2 which measures yearly percent wage gaps for
all other demographic groups relative to wages of white men. 
Consider first working black men.  As was true for white men,
real wages among black men also increased from 1962-1973, fell from
1973-1981, and then gradually rose to the present. However, the male
trends were far from identical between the races.  In particular,
1962-1976 were years during which the male racial wage gap declined
sharply from over a 50% wage gap at the beginning of the period to
about 32% at the end.  Then, relative progress ceased and may have
been put in reverse reaching a wage gap as high as 41% by 1986.  Given
the noise in the data, it is difficult to know with complete
confidence what has happened since, but a reasonable characterization
would be a modest but steady narrowing of the male racial wage.  
Secular trends in the wage gap among Latino men could not be more
different. Throughout the 1970s, the Latino male wage deficit with
white men held steady at about 30%.
7  During the last two decades,
however, this wage gap has grown, reaching about 45% by the mid-1990s.
8     
9 Similar patterns with a slightly higher wage gap exists for Mexican
women
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Once again, a different pattern emerges by gender. White female
wage gaps expanded from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s--the same
years when black men enjoyed their largest gains. The last twenty-five
years, however, witnessed a long sustained improvement in the wage
position of working women. By 1997, the white female wage deficit was
about 50% compared to a peak wage deficit of 73% in 1973.
Maintaining the emerging theme, African-American and Hispanic
women exhibit their own unique patterns.  By far, the largest relative
wage gains were made by black women.  The pace of early improvements
were staggering.  During 1962-1973 when real wages among white men
increased by 17%, real wage of black women expanded by 50%.  While the
pace of relative improvement slowed thereafter, it continued at a
steady pace until the percent wage gap for black women reached about
50% compared to initial levels almost twice that big.  In contrast to
Hispanic men, Hispanic women did experience some relative wage gains, 
but they were relatively small and confined to the 1970s.
9
As demonstrated in the previous section dealing with longer-term
movements, these recent trends may also be due to some well-
established labor market skill correlate such as schooling. Schooling
of workers changes only gradually as younger more educated workers
replace those less educated workers who are retiring.  Consequently,
labor market conditions among younger workers may be a more sensitive     
10In part this also results from the stratification by experience,
but it is mostly a consequence of the education stratification.
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barometer of some of the forces leading to labor market change.  With
this in mind, Figures 3 to 4 plot male minority wage gaps with white
men in two schooling groups--those workers with exactly twelve years
of schooling and those workers who are college graduates.  To
concentrate on the young, these wage gaps are displayed among workers
with 10 or fewer years of labor market experience.
It is no surprise that male wage gaps are significantly smaller
within education groups which simply speaks to education’s always
powerful role as a wage predictor.
10  While sampling variability plays
a more important role after these stratifications are made, one can
still characterize some trends with some confidence.  Among high
school graduates, the male racial wage gap has one sharp v shaped
pattern; a steep fall starting in 1976, reaching a trough in the mid
1980s, followed by a subsequent narrowing of the racial wage gap. 
However, despite these impressive cycles, the endpoints are
essentially the same so that the high school racial wage gap was
basically unchanged over these thirty years.  
Racial trends among college graduates are clearer. Starting with
a relatively large wage gap in the early 1960s, wages of black male
college graduates exploded until parity had almost been reached with
new white male college graduates by 1973. That parity would, however,
be short lived as the male racial wage gap among college grads17
eventually expanded until almost coming full circle by the end of the
period.  
An important pattern to note among male Hispanics is that their
within education wage deficits with white men (see Figure 3.b) are
considerably smaller than the racial wage gaps displayed in Figure
3.a. This is another reflection of the general finding that after one
controls for a rather small list of standard variables--schooling,
age, and English language ability--there is little left that is
unexplained about the wage differences between Latinos and whites--a
statement that one would clearly hesitate to make about racial
disparities.  After controlling for schooling and English language
ability, there is no discernible trend in the male wage gap among
Latinos.   An implication of this relatively small and constant within
schooling wage gap is that identifying the reasons underlying trends
in schooling and age may be enough to account for male Latino labor
market trends.  But schooling and years of work experience do not
comprise a sufficient explanation when the subject turns to race.
Figure 4 contains the within schooling trends for younger women
compared to younger men.  As a reasonable generalization, among all
demographic sub-groups, wage gaps with younger white men narrowed in
both schooling classes.  This indicates that relative schooling trends
by sex alone will not account for the narrowing of gender wage
differences.  Unlike race, the major discriminating variable for women
is not schooling but rather increasing years of labor force18
participation which had lead to greater amounts and quality of labor
market experience (Smith-Ward (1984)).  Another point to note is that
the narrowing of the gender wage gap was generally more pronounced
among college graduates.  For example, while the time period begins
with higher wage gaps among white female college grads, by the mid
1990s, this ranking had reversed and the gender wage deficit was
greatest among white high school graduates.
To this point, all wage comparisons have relied on mean wages
across demographic groups. A reliance solely on means is always
problematic, but never more so than during the years that we are
examining. Whatever was happening to differences among these
demographic groups, the major labor market action actually lies
elsewhere.  During these years, the overriding structural adjustment
in the labor market was the rapidly expanding increase in wage
inequality. This increase was dramatic even among white men and can be
summarized by a simple rule of thumb--the lower the initial wage or
skill the smaller the subsequent wage growth that took place. 
Combined with the fact that median wages were relatively flat during
most of this period, the end result was that workers below the median
experienced real wage losses while those above the median had real
wage gains.  While this structural adjustment was at its core not a
racial or ethnic issue, the implications of the structural change were
decidedly not racial or ethnic neutral.      
11 Data are normalized so that 11% of white working men are defined
as poor in 1979. Similar rules as those contained in footnote 1 were
used to set the other threshold values.
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One glimpse of its legacy is illustrated in Table 5 which
parallels Table 2 by dividing workers into 3 groups--the poor, middle
class and affluent--based on their wages 
11. Especially for women, this
trichotomy is not equivalent to poverty statistics in the conventional
sense.  Poverty thresholds are based on family incomes (with
equivalence scale adjustments for family composition and size) while
my separation are based on own wages only.  My distinctions are simply
a separation into three wage classes to determine where different
demographic groups end up in the wage hierarchy and how that
separation has changed over time.
In addition to endpoints, data are presented at 9 year intervals
in Table 5.  The dominant trend among white men is not any increased
impoverishment at the bottom, but rather a sharp growth in the
fraction of workers labeled ‘affluent.’  By 1997, more than one in
three white male workers were affluent compared to one-in-every-four
in 1962.  Using these thresholds, the relative decline in middle class
workers revealed in Table 5 was due to an increasing fraction of
affluent workers rather than any expansion in the ranks of the poor.
Our central interest centers on the relative status of the other
groups. The principal gains made in reductions in the ranks of poor
working African-American men was concentrated in the ten years between
1962 and 1973. Thereafter, the era of stagnation took over with black 20
Table 5
Income Group Status of Workers
___________________________________________________________________________
1962 1973 1982 1991 1997
___________________________________________________________________________
White Men
 Poor 10 11 12 12 12
 Middle Class 66 62 57 55 54
 Affluent 24 27 31 33 34
Black Men
 Poor 26 17 17 19 16
 Middle Class 70 75 70 65 65
 Affluent 4 8 13 16 19
Hispanic Men
 Poor NA 14 14 17 17
 Middle Class NA 66 72 70 69
 Affluent NA 10 14 13 14
Mexican Men
 Poor NA 15 14 19 18
 Middle Class NA 75 71 70 70
 Affluent NA 8 15 11 12
White Women
 Poor 32 31 30 25 23
 Middle Class 65 66 66 64 62
 Affluent 3 3 4 11 15
Black Women
 Poor 60 34 30 27 24
 Middle Class 39 63 67 65 65
 Affluent 1338 1 0
Hispanic Women
 Poor NA 31 30 31 28
 Middle Class NA 68 67 67 65
 Affluent NA 1367
Mexican Women
 Poor NA 39 29 34 31
 Middle Class NA 60 68 61 63
 Affluent NA 1356
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male poverty rates essentially the same in 1997 as they were 25 years
earlier. However, not all was stagnant in the economic status of the
black community.  In the 35 years spanned by the data in Table 5,
there was almost a quintupling in relative numbers of black male
workers whom I label affluent. Unlike the working poverty series, this
trend among the black affluent shows no sign of any abatement. 
Growing numbers of African-American male workers have not only entered
the middle class--they have gone right past it.
In much muted form, similar trends exist for Hispanic men. Among
both Hispanic and Mexican men, the fraction poor drifted upward over
this period. Simultaneously, the proportion of Latino men classified
as affluent rose although in contrast to African-American men, this
entry into the ranks of the affluent was completed by the early 1980s. 
The division in Table 5 using wages must be interpreted with even
more care when we turn to women.  Many women whose own wages may be
low live in families with relatively high incomes. These women would
not be classified as poor in any welfare sense. Yet, it is still of
interest to examine how they rank based solely on their own wages
alone. Since many women are only working part time, much larger
fractions of them had weekly wages placing them in the poor jobs while
only a relative handful are able to join the ranks of the affluent.
The division into these three groups changed little for white women
until the early 1980s. Thereafter, there has been a rapid fall in the
fraction of white women in ‘poor’ jobs, and an even more impressive22
jump in their participation in the elite class.  In contrast, the
drama among black women took place during the 1960s when their
representation among the poor was almost cut in half.  At a much
reduced pace, these improvements for black women have continued. In
1997, one-in-four African-American women have weekly wages classifying
them as poor compared to 6 in 10 in the early 1960s.  In contrast, the
changes for Latinas is modest--a slight reduction in the fraction poor
alongside a more pronounced increase in their proportions among the
elite.  
One must be impressed by the diversity in secular wage trends
among these different minority group workers. Not only did the size of
their wage gaps with white men change at quite different rates, but
the periods during which major changes occurred are all over the map.
A single factor, common in timing to all groups, apparently will not
explain all the large changes that have been taking place during the
last few decades in the structure of wages across these demographic
groups.
Section 3- Explaining Recent Wage Trends
To this point, I have mostly presented facts that need to be
explained. How can such an extraordinary diverse set of relative wage
trends across groups be explained?  Initially, I will divide the
potential explanations into four categories--differences in schooling,
changing quality of minority students, affirmative action, and23
structural labor market changes especially rising wage inequality. 
For women, this set will clearly not be sufficient and I must add a
fifth--the increased entry of women into the labor market and the
growing amounts of labor market experience that go along with it. 
Finally, additional issues related to their immigrant status arise
when the subject turns to Latinos, but these are addressed in Section
4. 
Recent Trends in Education
No discussion of trends in the wage gap proceeds very far without
addressing the role of schooling.  Figs. 5 and 6 plot education
deficits of each demographic group with white men. Schooling
differences still persist between the races, but they are far less now
than at any time in our history.  Fig. 5.a shows the education deficit
of black male workers steadily declined from a more than two year
schooling deficit, plateauing at one-half year of schooling by the mid
1990s. If these schooling trends are compared with trends in the male
racial wage gap, the issue is not the early years when the two
series(wage gap and schooling deficit) moved in lockstep.  Rather, the
anomaly involves the last twenty years when schooling deficits
continued to narrow while male racial wage gaps stagnated.
If only younger male workers are examined (Fig. 5.b), there took
place a steady narrowing of schooling deficits in the 20 years between
1962-1982.  Throughout this century, schooling has been the engine of24
black economic progress, but educational progress for men stopped
abruptly in the 1980's when the schooling gap of young black male
workers remained constant at about one-half a year. The 1980's and
1990s cohorts represent the first generation of black workers who have
not lowered schooling gaps with white workers.  This end of racial
progress is not due to growing numbers of black high school dropouts
as the fraction of high school dropouts continued to fall in the
1980's. The problem lies in the transition from high school to
college, where black men are no more likely to make that transition
now than 15 years ago.
These trends could not be any more different among Latino
workers. For both all male workers and those who are relatively new to
the labor force, their schooling gap with white workers has remained
constant at over two years.  Since black workers were steadily closing
their deficits, by the mid 1990s, the typical Hispanic worker trailed
his black counterpart by about two years of schooling.
In the time period under examination, there were never large
differences in average schooling of white male and female workers
(Fig. 6.a). Gender disparities in schooling among workers depends both
on underlying education trends in the full population as well as in
trends in female labor force participation rates across schooling
classes.  For both reasons, among workers, white male schooling
actually rose faster than white females until after the early 1980s
(see Smith-Ward (1984)). Then, white female workers took the lead25
until they reclaimed their traditional educational advantage with
white men. This resurgence stems from more rapid education gains among
women compared to men; gains that were reinforced by more rapid gains
in labor force participation rates among more educated women.
Paralleling their rapid relative wage advances, black female workers
steadily narrowed their education disparity with white men. It is a
remarkable point in American history that at least among young
workers, there are now essentially no differences in schooling between
white men and black women. Finally, Latinas did somewhat better than
their male counterparts in that they slightly narrowed their schooling
gaps with white men.
To sum up, what role can changing education disparities play in
accounting for changing wage disparities across these demographic
groups over the last few decades? Until the mid-1970s, schooling
continued to assume its historical role as the primary determinant of
the male racial wage gap. However, male education differences by race
cannot account for the timing and magnitude of the racial stagnation
of the last twenty-five years. Nor can schooling account for the
impressive narrowing of the gender wage gap of the last few decades.
However, the stagnation and decline in Latino wages relative to
native-born whites is consistent with the apparent lack of relative
education progress of the average Latino worker. The adjective
‘apparent’ is necessary since the absence of progress is mostly due to26
a compositional effect of the addition of new Latino immigrants with
low levels of schooling. 
Achievement Scores
One possible explanation for the recent stagnation in black labor
market gains, especially among black men, that fortunately can be
dismissed is that their labor force quality has been falling.  The
origins of any such decline presumably would lie in the schools.  If
the quality of minority students was falling, this would eventually
show up as lower wages in the labor market.  In spite of widespread
and legitimate concerns that the quality of contemporary schooling for
minority students was low and falling, achievement data tell a
different story.  For example, Table 7 documents a persistent
improvement in the achievement of black high school students compared
to those of whites.  No matter whether we look at reading or math,
white achievement scores of 17-year-olds have drifted only slightly
upward across the last two decades.  In contrast, black scores have
consistently improved, and the racial gap has narrowed considerably. 
To cite examples, 45 (33) percent of the racial gap in reading
proficiency (math) of 17-year-olds has been erased since 1971.
This racial improvement is not due to the dropout of less able
black students who end up not taking the exam.  Test scores are also
presented for 13-year-olds where high school dropouts are not an
issue.  Across both math, reading and science, the achievement gap by27
 Table 7
Achievement Scores of High School Students
__________________________________________________________________________________
Proficiency in
Reading 1971 1980 1984 1990 1996
 
White 13 yr old 261 264 263 262 267
Black 13 yr old 222 233 236 242 236
Hispanic 13 yr old -- 237 240 238 240
White 17 yr old  291 293 295 297 294
Black 17 yr old  239 243 264 267 265
Hispanic 17 yr old -- 261 268 275 265
Percent of students rated
  adept at reading 1971 1980 1984 1990 1996
White 43.2 43.3 46.3 50.1 45.1
Black 7.7 7.1 16.2 16.9 18.0
Hispanic -- 16.5 21.2 27.1 20.0
Science 1973 1977 1986 1990 1996
White 13 yr old 263 256 257 264 266
Black 13 yr old 205 208 221 226 226
Hispanic 13 yr old -- 213 226 232 232
White 17 yr old 304 298 298 301 307
Black 17 yr old 250 240 253 253 260
Hispanic 17 yr old -- 262 259 262 269
Mathematics 1973 1978 1986 1990 1996
White 13 yr old 274 272 274 276 281
Black 13 yr old 228 230 249 249 252
Hispanic 13 yr old 239 238 254 255 256
White 17 yr old 310 306 308 310 313
Black 17 yr old 270 268 279 289 286
Hispanic 17 yr old 277 276 283 284 292
SAT scores of college-
  bound seniors
1976 1980 1990 1995
  Verbal
    White 451 442 442 448
    Black 332 330 352 356
    Mexican-Americans 371 372 380 376
  Mathematics
    White 493 482 491 498
    Black 354 360 385 388
    Mexican-Americans 410 413 429 426
___________________________________________________________________________________
  SOURCE:  Trends in Academic Progress, National Center for Education Statistics: 
Education Testing Service, 1991.28
race among 13-year-olds has also been narrowing. Similar evidence of a
narrowing in scholastic achievement by race can be obtained from SAT
scores of college bound seniors.
Monitoring trends in student achievement is far more difficult
among Hispanics due to the possible contamination in trend caused by
the continuing influx of new immigrants. If these new immigrants
perform less well in these tests, average Hispanic scores may decline
without any change in ability of any Latino students.  In spite of
this potential problem, achievement scores of Hispanic students also
improved relative to non-Hispanic whites, albeit at a slower rate of
secular gain than black students enjoyed.  
Affirmative Action
What is the evidence on the last three decades of affirmative
action enforcement on the economic position of minorities? Overall,
the evidence is mixed with much more consensus on employment effects
than on wages and disagreements on the exact timing and sustainability
of impacts.   
On one issue there appears now to be little ambiguity.  There is
abundant evidence that affirmative action changed where black men and
women worked and the jobs they were able to obtain especially in the
late 1960's and early 1970's ((Chay (1998), Donahue and Heckman
(1991),Holzer and Neumark (1999),  Smith and Welch (1984)).  If
affirmative action was effective, minority representation should have
expanded more among firms required to report to EEOC.  Since they have29
more to lose, the greatest gains in employment should also occur among
federal contractors.  Finally, the largest minority gains should be
detected within professional and managerial jobs.  
The accumulative evidence shows these types of employment
effects.  For example, Smith and Welch (1984) compared time series
changes in minority employment by whether firms were covered by EEOC
and by whether the firm was a federal contractor.  They show that
black men were 8% less likely than white men to work in covered firms
in 1966.  By 1980, however, black men were 26 percent more likely to
work in EEOC-reporting firms.  Adding to the suspicion that these were
affirmative action-induced changes, these employment shifts were
dominated by firms that were federal contractors.
As large as these increases in total employment seem, they pale
next to changes within the professional jobs.  Black male
professionals were 41 percent less likely than white professionals to
work in covered firms in 1966.  By 1980, black male professionals were
equally likely to be found in covered firms.  A critical issue relates
to the timing of effects.  The largest employment changes for men
occurred between 1966 and 1970(the first four years of required
reporting).  After 1974, there was little further change in the
location of black male employment by EEOC coverage.
Changes in the sectoral location of employment were even more
dramatic and enduring among black women.  In 1966, black women were 9
percent less likely than white men to be employed in the covered30
sector. By 1980, they were 54% more likely than white men to work in
the covered sector.  Once again, the relocation was more pronounced
for officials and managers--39 percent less likely in covered 
employment in 1966; 54% more likely by 1980. Compared to these racial
differences, there was a slight expansion in employment of white women
(and officials and managers) in covered EEOC employment. Many clerical
jobs that had been traditionally held by white women in the covered
sector now were held instead by African-American women.
In sum, Smith and Welch (1984) demonstrate that the employment
effects of affirmative action differ between black women and black
men. For men, there was a very rapid increase in demand for black
workers that appears to be been largely completed in stock terms by
1974. For black women, the increase in demand was even larger and it
persisted throughout the 1970s. 
This evidence on employment effects is supported in other
studies. For example, Chay (1998) analyzes the effects of the 1972
expansion of EEOC coverage to employers with 15-24 employees and finds
that there were shifts in employment favoring black workers following
this expansion in coverage, particularly in the South (where  prior
state laws did not exist which covered such firms).  Similarly, in an
important paper, Heckman and Paynor (1989) demonstrated that 1965 was
a year of an extremely sharp break in the employment of black men and
women in the textile industry in South Carolina. This break was so
severe and its timing so precise that there is no other plausible     
12This section draws upon and  extends Smith (1993).
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explanation except that it was the consequence of the passage of the
civil rights act of 1964.
The wage effects that one can assign to affirmative action are
far more controversial and uncertain. However, the rapidity and
magnitude of the increases in black male and female wages during the
late 1960s and early 1970s can not be easily explained by the more
slowly evolving changes in the skill distributions between the races.
For example, the case that affirmative action pressures that lead to
the shifts in employment contributed to black male wages relative
gains in the late 1960s and early 1970s is a strong one.  For similar
reasons, the case is even stronger that affirmative action played an
important role in the extraordinary wage gains enjoyed by black women
throughout the late 1960s and 1970s.
Did cutbacks in affirmative action resources and pressures also
account for the recent labor market stagnation especially for black
men?
12 Some feel that affirmative action is the likely culprit beyond
recent black economic stagnation because these policies were
significantly changed in the 1980's (see Table 8).  EEOC resources
were indeed cut during this period.  EEOC inflation-adjusted budgets
grew almost 15 percent per year during the 1970's.  While there was
some slowdown in the last half of the decade, constant dollar EEOC
budgets expanded by 7 percent per year during the Carter32
administration, and almost 1400 budgeted positions were added to the
agency (a growth of 50 percent) between 1976 and 1980.  
Table 8
Summary Statistics for EEOC
__________________________________________________________________
Budgeta Charges
Year ($1000) Positionsa Resolvedb Lawsuitsa
__________________________________________________________________
1966 16,098 314 6,400 NA
1970 55,428 780 8,480 NA
1975 164,319 2,384 62,300 180
1980 242,829 3,777 49,225 326
1985      244,113 3,107   46,411
1991 237,954 2,796 45,442 495
1995 244,998 2,813 54,464 318
1997 239,740 2,586 62,533 296
__________________________________________________________________
   Budget in 1997 dollars.
   aSource for 1995 and 1997 data: A Summary of Enforcement Data and
Budget and Staffing Information for the U.S. Equal Opportunity
Commission.  Personal communication, September 1998.
   bSource: A Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges
FY 1991-1997.  From Enforcement Data at EEOC=s website.
There is no question that the Reagan era witnessed an abrupt end
to the growth in resources that would have taken place.  EEOC constant
dollar budgets actually fell during this period, and the number of
positions declined by almost one thousand. Two presidents later there
has been virtually no resource recovery.
And as EEOC resources and personnel fell during the 1980's, so
did measurable outputs.  The sharp break in the 1980's was not so much
in the total amount of activity, but in its composition and the
resources available per case.  Spurred by the passage of the age
discrimination act in 1979, age came into its own during this decade. 
Starting with only 14 cases in the year after passage of the act, the
number of age cases rose at an astonishing pace to over thirty33
thousand by 1992.  Even without this explosion in age related charges,
the significance of race was declining.   By 1992, only 40 percent of
all cases involved race issues compared to 85 percent of all charges
in 1970.  During the 1990s, the new competitor for enforcement
resources were cases related to the passage of disability laws.
Combined age and disability cases now account for 20% more cases than





Year Race Sex Age Disability
______________________________________________________
1965 0 0 0 0
1966 3,254 2,053 0 0
1970 11,806 3,572 0 0
1975 33,174 20,205 0 0
1980 44,436 28,171 14 0
1986 47,264 30,576 23,142 0
1992 49,309 41,314 30,064 0
1995 50,879 48,923 28,858 34,282
_____________________________________________________
   
aPrior to 1995, this series was called "Actionable
Charges" and taken from EEOC Annual Reports.  Subsequently
this data is from "Fiscal Year Charge Receipts by Geo-
graphic Region EEOC and FEP Agencies," EEOC Annual Report.
The declining importance of race in the EEOC’s agenda reflects a
more general dilution of race as this country's core civil rights
concern.  Since 1965, the road to equal rights became very crowded.
The quest for racial justice was the clear moral force behind the 1965
civil rights act with women added in an unsuccessful attempt to
scuttle the legislation.  Subsequently, Hispanics began to rival
blacks in political clout, and protected minority group status was
extended to men over forty, those with a disability, and gays.  The34
end result is that more than three quarters of today’s labor force
enjoy protected minority group status.  Blacks are now a minority in
the protected minority class which itself represents the majority. 
Trends in the courts reinforce these changes at the EEOC.  In the
early years, plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases were the
clear winners in the courtroom battles, winning twice as often as
defendants did.  The odds quickly began to shift throughout the 1970's
and 1980's, until firms now win three times as many cases as
plaintiffs. Not only were the odds shifting in the courtroom, but one
of the most potent weapons in discrimination cases was steadily
falling into disuse.  A firm's potential financial cost from a
discrimination lawsuit was substantially magnified when an individual
complaint was filed as typical of an entire class of workers.  In
1971, one in every four employment discrimination cases became class-
action.  Today, less than one in every 200 cases are class-action.
The fact that affirmative action did affect black employment in
the 1970's and that policy changed so dramatically in the 1980's makes
it easy to understand why affirmative action retrenchment may also
have been responsible for the racial wage stagnation in the 1980's. 
While it is plausible, it turns out to be incorrect. The main problem
is that the timing of the wage stagnation had little connection to the
timing of the affirmatives action cutbacks. For example, Figure 2a
shows that the stagnation in aggregate black male wages began in 1977
and remained so during the Carter years when EEOC resources were35
expanding rapidly. Indeed among male high school graduates (Figure
3.b), the large bulk of the decline in the racial wage gap took place
during the EEOC surge in resources. Among college graduates, the large
decline in the male racial wage gap appears to taken place well after
the cutback in EEOC resources.   
During the initial phases of affirmative action, there was a
remarkable surge in the incomes of young college educated black men to
almost complete wage parity.  There is little question that this was
an affirmative action-induced benefit.  First, the sharp acceleration
in black male wage gains during the late 1960's and early 1970's
coincided with the large affirmative action-induced employment effects
that we talked about earlier as blacks moved in large numbers into the
covered sector.  Second, the wage gains blacks achieved during these
years are simply too large to be explained  by the more slowly
evolving historical process of racial skill convergence. This was,
however, an ephemeral benefit as early wage gains exaggerate the
permanent affirmative action wage effect.   For college graduates,
this erosion marked both decades until we had roughly come full circle
with a wage deficit in 1997 little different than that for which we 
Why did the early male gains from affirmative action not persist? 
By the mid-1970's, the labor market adjustment to affirmative action
had largely taken place. Affirmative action caused many more black men
to be employed in the EEOC-covered sector.  But this adjustment was
largely finished by the mid-1970's, so that there was little36
additional reason for these firms to disproportionately hire black
men. In addition, the black male supply response was rapid and large. 
In the ten years after 1967, the number of black male college grads in
the work force had more than doubled while the increase in the number
of white college workers was less than half as large.  There were now
a lot more college-educated blacks. This large supply response had two
effects.  First, it directly produced a falloff in relative black male
college wages among new entrants.  But it also eventually eradicated
the initial wage benefit received by the generation of black college
graduates most favorably influenced by affirmative action.  
Another difficulty in assigning a significant wage role to
affirmative action is that many other confounding forces were at work
that could have altered the racial wage gap. In particular, the labor
market was going through a major structural shift--a shift that was
extremely unfavorable to minority workers.
Rising Wage Inequality
This structural shift involved the substantial widening of wage
dispersion (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1991). Since, as a first
approximation during the 1960s, distributions shifted up down in more
or less uniform ways, until the mid-1970s, it was safe to compare
groups based on means or medians alone.  Now, the median describes
almost no one very well. Those whose wages were initially below the
median suffered significant real wages losses while workers above the
median enjoyed inflation adjusted wage increases. 37
Figure 7 summarizes these changes by plotting percent wage
changes relative to 1962 for white male workers. To see the




th percentiles. With a bit of oversimplification,
this period can be divided into 3 segments--median wage growth of 15%
between 1962 and 1971, a real wage decline of 14% between 1971 and
1981, and (with due respect for business cycle variation), constant
real wages thereafter.
Using the same time demarcation points, the world was very
different at the bottom and at the top. For example, contrast the 20
th
and 80
th percentiles. During the first period of sustained economic
growth, real wages were growing for everyone, albeit at a more rapid
rate at the top (17% at the 80
th and 8% at the 20
th percentile).  The
bottom truly fell out in the years between 1971 and 1981; a real wage
decline of 6% at the 80
th percentile, but a whopping 25% at the 20
th
weekly wage percentile.  Things improved somewhat after 1981 (wage
growth of 10% at the top and a decline of 8% at the 20
th percentile).
The cumulative effect has been enormous--since 1971 a 37% fall in
wages at the 20
th percentile compared to wages at the 80
th. 
Quite appropriately, I have described this structural change
without mentioning race, ethnicity, or gender. While the reasons for
this structural labor market shift have nothing to do with such
matters, the consequences was anything but race or ethnic neutral. The
reason is that workers in these demographic groups are found in very38
different places in the wage distributions than white men are.  For
example, in 1971 the median black male worker earned $412 a week-
equivalent to what a white worker earned at the 25
th percentile of the
white male wage distribution. Between 1971 and 1981, wages at the 25
th
percentile of the white wage distribution declined by 20% quite close
to what was happening to the median black worker. 
Given the size of this structural change, it is actually
remarkable that when using means or medians we only characterize
recent years as racial labor market stagnation and not a free fall. 
If black workers were treated the same as comparable whites (those in
the 25
th percentile of the white wage distribution), the median black
male wages would have actually fallen by 27% since 1971 instead of
rising by 3%.  If that 27% were added to what actually happened,
evaluated at the median, wages of blacks would trail those of whites
by single digit amounts.  These last twenty years were actually a time
during which the slowing evolving historical forces continued to close
the wage gap of black and white male workers. These forces were simply
overwhelmed by the structural shift of rising wage dispersion.
Latino workers also felt the consequences of widening wage
dispersion.  Figure 8.a illustrates the process by plotting percent
wage changes at each percentile of the wage distribution for Latino
and Native-white residents of Los Angeles County between 1970 and
1990.  Both distributions reveal growing wage dispersion--wages grow
more the higher one is in the wage distribution.  While they share39
that similarity, the Latino curve lies well below those of native-
whites.  While there was virtually no change for the median white
male, real wages at the Latino median male worker fell by almost 40%.
The distance between the curves is so large that one must get to
almost the 90
th percentile for Latinos before any wage gains are
registered.  
Most but not all these differences are due to rising wage
dispersion.  Figure 8.b adjusts the Latino curve by subtracting from
their observed wage changes the wage change observed for comparable
whites (at the white percentile with the same wage as Latinos in
1970).  The adjusted Latino wage-percentiles show about a 10-13%
negative wage change that becomes somewhat smaller above the median.  
Seventy-five percent of  declining wages at the median for Latinos in
Los Angeles is due to widening wage dispersion in that city.  The
remaining 10-12% wage deficit has to due with factors unique to the
immigrant experience, a subject to which I now turn.  
Section 4- Special Issues With Hispanic Immigrants
There are three overriding issues that have dominated labor
market research about immigrants and Hispanic immigrants in
particular.  These issues are (1) the changing labor market skills of
new immigrants, (2)life-cycle assimilation, and (3) the extent of
generational progress.  Despite the extensive available research on40
this questions, these issues remain controversial. In this section, I
present new evidence on these questions. 
The Changing Labor Market Quality of Immigrants
While immigrant wages in the U.S. typically far exceed earnings
in their home countries, how do they compare with wages of native-born
workers?  A first step toward an index of their changing relative
economic status is obtained by looking at relative wages of new
entering immigrant cohorts. Table 10 lists wage differentials of ‘new
arrival’ Latino male immigrants compared to the native-born.  As is
the case with most such comparisons, ‘new arrivals’ are defined as
those who came within the last five years using the Census question on
what year you came to the U.S.  While recent arrivals earned much less
than natives throughout the last five decades, this wage gap has
widened considerably during the period 1970-1990 for both male and
female Latino immigrants.  For example, in 1970 the gap for Latino men
was 48 percent; by 1990 it had almost doubled to 83%.  Similarly, the
gap for Mexican immigrants rose from 65% in 1970 to 94% by 1990. 
Why did relative wages decline among new Hispanic immigrants? 
Part of the answer is supplied by the education deficits listed in the
same table.  Even though recent new Latino arrivals are better
educated than their predecessors, the education of native-born workers
has been rising even faster. Since 1970, the education gap for new
Latino immigrants has increased from 2.7 years to 4.3 years. The41
reasons for the expanding wage gap of new Latino immigrants is not
much of a mystery--the gap in their relative skills widened over time.
Especially during the last few decades, as the skill gap widened, the
wage gap widened even more due to the rising inequality in wages.
Rising wage inequality implies larger wage differences holding
constant skill differences. Therefore, as skill differences between
Latino immigrants and native-born American workers expanded over time,
the wage difference must expand even more.
Table 10
% New Arrival Latino Male Wage and Education Gap 
with Native-Born Men
Year
1940 1960 1970 1980 1990
Hispanic Men
% wage deficit -52.2 -47.6 -47.7 -63.3 -82.9
Education deficit 1.27 1.90 2.71 4.31 4.27
Mexican Men
% wage deficit -87.0 -55.6 -65.4 -71.1 -93.6
Education deficit 3.31 4.34 5.19 5.73 5.05
But this is an incomplete story for two reasons.  First, Jasso,
Rosenzweig, and Smith (1999) demonstrate that during the last 15 years
the trends documented in Table 11 have actually reversed. Using data
from the CPSs, they show that the relative incomes and schooling of
Hispanic immigrants has been rising during the 1990s and not declining
as is commonly asserted.
Secondly, the sort of data compiled in Table 11, and in virtually
all such comparisons of ‘new’ immigrants, rely on Census or CPS style     
13Nonimmigrants are those in the United States on a temporary visa.
Tourists and students are two numerically large examples.
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questions on the year of immigration.  In the same paper, Jasso,
Rosenzweig and Smith (1999) demonstrate that data obtained from such
questions are misleading for two reasons. First, the Census question
on time since immigration is inherently confused in light of the
frequent trips made by immigrants back and forth to their home
countries.  
In addition, many immigrants in the Census and CPS files are not
legal immigrants.  For example, a recent study estimated that only 20%
of those Mexicans who reported that they immigrated since 1990 in the
1995 and 1996 CPS’s were legal immigrants (Passell (1999)).  The
remainder were either nonimmigrants
13 or in the case of Mexicans
primarily illegal immigrants.  When data are presented on trends for
legal immigrants alone, a quite different picture emerges.  During
most of the last 25 years, the labor market quality of all new male
legal immigrants (all ethnic groups combined) has been as high or
higher than that of male native-born workers.  Second, while the labor
market quality of all male legal immigrants was indeed falling during
the 1970s and early 1980s, there has been a steady rise in the labor
market quality of all legal immigrants during the last half of the
1980s and throughout the 1990s. If illegals comprise an increasing
fraction of the Mexican foreign-born in the CPS and the Census, this
will lead to a steadily rising wage gap with native-born men. The     
14See Smith and Edmonston 1997.
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changing composition of Mexican immigrants between those who are
legal, those who are nonimmigrants, and those who are undocumented
will be an important underlying reason for any changes in immigrant
wage differences overtime. 
Life-Cycle Assimilation
Another central issue concerning immigrants and hence the
economic status of Hispanics concerns economic assimilation over the
immigrant's lifetime.  This question has been a source of considerable
controversy (Borjas (1985), Chiswick (1978)), but some consensus is
now being reached.  To address this question, it is necessary to
follow groups of immigrant cohorts over their lives in the U.S.  A
representative sample of patterns resulting from this tracking of
immigrant cohorts is presented in Figs 9 and 10.
14 These figures plot--
for specific cohorts of immigrants defined by time of entry into the
country--their percent wage gap with comparably aged native-born white
workers.  These figures deal with relatively young immigrants--those
aged 25-34 during the Census year immediately following their time of
initial entry.  Separate figures are provided for men and women and
separately for all immigrants and those immigrant of Mexican origin.
Consider first the profiles for all immigrants.  On average, male
and female immigrants do narrow their wage gap with natives as their
stay in the United States lengthens.  Over time, the wage gap closes44
for some--significantly for immigrants from Europe and Asia and
modestly for others.  But as these figures also illustrate, initial
gaps at time of entry has been growing.  While immigrants do narrow
the wage gap with time, the distance to be traveled is longer, and the
time it will take to reach wage parity with natives will take longer.
This positive overall evaluation of within generation wage
assimilation does not pertain to male or female Mexicans who remain
the exception to the general rule.  Both female and male Mexican
immigrants essentially maintain their initial wage gaps with native-
born white workers.  It is important, however, to keep the reference
group in mind when interpreting this finding.  Our result implies that
Mexican immigrants experience wage growth over their careers in the
U.S. that is just as large as native-born whites.  Seen in this light,
this result could be interpreted more positivity as indicating that
Latino immigrants are ‘assimilating’ into the same career experiences
as native-born whites.
However, when the reference group is non-Mexican immigrants,
careers of Latino immigrants do not stand up as well.  Why do Mexican
immigrants do less well than other immigrant groups? One explanation
that actually goes in the other direction stems from the previously
mentioned point about the composition of immigrant samples in the
Census and CPS. A large fraction of what researchers have labeled new
immigrants are actually illegal immigrants or nonimmigrants. This
fraction is particularly large (more than a majority) for Mexican45
immigrants.  Since these are mostly illegals, who on average are less
skilled than other Mexican immigrants and will probably have a shorter
expected duration in the United States, selectivity of out-migrants
from the original group alone would imply that the data should show
rising relative incomes of Mexican immigrants as time since
immigration lengthens.  Since the data indicate instead basically a
constant ratio, it implies that the true relative life-cycle wage
progression of Mexican immigrants may actually be even more negative.
Why would this be so?  To date, there is no convincing answer to
this question which should receive high priority in the research
agenda.  One can speculative about the role of language or the
implications of the geographic closeness to country-of-origin, but
there is little concrete evidence to document any compelling
explanation.  Other immigrant groups--Asians would be a good example--
arrive without complete English language fluency and many immigrant 
have frequent trips back and forth to their home countries. 
Part of the problem lies in the inherent ambiguity in using
tracking of cohorts across Census or CPS files to evaluate life-cycle
progress of immigrants.  While cohort tracking has become the standard
technique for evaluating economic assimilation, cohort tracking is
problematic as immigrant cohorts are not closed. An initial immigrant
cohort can be depleted as some immigrants return home. If, as seems
likely, those immigrants who left the country were highly selective,
the wage trajectories obtained from cohort tracking will be biased. 46
For example, if high-skill/high-wage immigrants left, average wages of
the remaining members of the cohort would fall even if the wage of
every single immigrant remained the same. This problem caused by out-
migration from an initial entering immigrant cohort is especially
severe among immigrants from Mexico.  In the aggregate, roughly
one-third of the recent 1970 Mexican immigrants had emigrated by 1980.
An even smaller fraction of the original immigrant cohort would remain
by 1990. Until this problem of the nature of the selectivity of 
emigration of previous Mexican immigrant cohorts can be resolved, one
should be cautious about reaching any strong conclusions about the
nature of life-cycle labor market careers of Mexican immigrants.
Generational assimilation. 
On the issue of generational assimilation, the conventional
wisdom for Hispanics--whom some argue have not shared in the
successful earlier European experience--leans toward the pessimistic
side.  The reasons for pessimism vary, but one theme is that Hispanic
immigrants and their children may be less committed to assimilation
than the Europeans were.  The data supporting this concern are often




generation Hispanics of their income and schooling levels.  Such
comparisons universally show the following patterns--a narrowing of
the schooling and income gap between the 1
st and 2
nd generation, but
either retrogression or little progress between the 2
nd and 3
rd
generation (see Smith (1999) for details).  While conclusions about47
generational assimilation are often drawn from such data, these
inferences are not appropriate.  In any cross-section, members of the
second generation are not sons and daughters of current immigrants and
simultaneously current third generation in a cross section are not
direct descendants of current second generation persons.
Fortunately, the conventional wisdom appears to be in error.  In
a recent paper, I examined this issue of generational assimilation of
Hispanics in detail (See Smith (1999)).  In that paper, I arrayed the
data in a more appropriate way so that on can track directly the
progress made across generations. The schooling deficits of Hispanics 
are uniformly smaller in the second generation than in the first and
are lower still in the third generation.  To illustrate, the mean
education disparity among all first generation Mexicans was 4.94. 
This average schooling deficit fell to 2.95 years among second
generation Mexicans.  The youngest third generation cohorts had less
than a year schooling gap with white men--half as large as their
fathers’ education deficit. 
At least based on the historical record, fears about Latino
generational assimilation appear to be unwarranted as second and third
generation Hispanic men have made considerable strides in narrowing
their economic disparities with native white men.  One reason for
these economic gains is that each successive generation has been able
to close their schooling gap with native whites--their schooling
deficits are uniformly smaller:  in the second generation than in the     
15 Wealth modules were included in the 1984, 1989, and 1994 waves of
the PSID See Juster, Stafford, Smith (1999) for a detailed discussion.
Also see Browning-Lusardi (1994) for an excellent review of the micro
savings literature.
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first and are lower still in the third generation.  These schooling
gains across the generations were translated into similar generational
progress in incomes.  Each new Hispanic generation not only had higher
incomes than their forefathers, but their economic status converged
relative to white men with whom they had to compete. 
Section 5- Household Wealth 
Until recently, data limitations forced most comparisons of
racial economic status to rely only on income differences, but new
survey improvements in measuring wealth have now made contrasts of
household wealth levels feasible.  Table 11 lists mean and median
household wealth levels by race derived from the PSID.
15 Racial wealth
gaps are extremely large, especially compared to the already sizable
household income differences by race that exist at the same time.  In
1984, mean wealth of non-white households was 22% of wealth of white
households while the income ratio in the same year was 58%.  Wealth
differentials are even larger if medians are used as the yardstick;
then in 1984 non-white households have less than 10% of the wealth of
white households.  The glimmer of hope is that the relative wealth
differentials did narrow over the ten year period covered in this
table. By 1994, mean non-white wealth rose to 31% of those of whites.49
Table 11
Wealth and Income Levels by Race
____________________________________________________________________________
Wealth Income
Mean Median Mean Median
____________________________________________________________________________
A. Total Household Wealth
______________________________
White
1984 169.0 59.4 48.9 39.1
1989 181.1 59.6 59.6 39.5
1994 178.5 64.7 52.9 41.0
Non-White
1984 37.1 5.3 28.5 21.7
1989 53.5 6.8 29.9 22.3












   Source:  PSID--1996 dollars.  Calculations by author.
Racial and ethnic disparities are even larger in financial
assets. These more liquid assets may be a better index of resources a
household has on hand to meet emergencies.  In 1984, mean financial
assets for non-whites were one-seventh of those of white households. 
Not only is the ratio of financial assets by race low, the amount of
financial assets held by non-white households are meager.  In 1984,
non-white households had a little over $7,000 per household in
financial assets.  But even this number exaggerates their holdings due     
16This point about the low relative importance of past bequests in
creating wealth differences in the current generation is fundamentally
different than the debate about the importance of the bequest motive
in accounting for savings behavior of the current generation. The
current generation’s savings are forward looking so that any savings
for bequests by the current generation are meant for the subsequent
generation.  Given the secular rise in bequests, savings for bequests
50
to the extreme skew in the distribution.  In all three years, the
median non-white household had no financial assets at all.
A more complete description of racial wealth differences is given
in Figure 11 which plots for each race household wealth at percentiles
of the wealth distribution. These figures illustrate the extreme skew
to wealth holdings-the top 5% of white households have 50% more wealth
than do white households at the 90
th percentile, while those at the 90
th
percentile have more than 5 times as much as the median white
household.  This non-linearity prevails within the lower half of the
wealth distribution as well, as the median white household has 10
times as much wealth as those at the 20th percentile.  A similar
extreme skew characterizes the non-white wealth distribution.
Why are racial wealth differentials at least twice as large as 
household income differences in the same years?  One possibility can
easily be dismissed. It is not a consequence of financial wealth being
transmitted across generations with the poor unable to give and the
well to do insuring their heirs remain at the top through financial
inheritances.  While plausible, this possibility is quantitatively
unimportant as the vast majority of households--both white and non-
whiteBdo not receive any financial inheritances.
16 Using PSID, meanmay be large part of a current generations’ savings while their
receipt of past financial inheritances are inconsequential in their
own present wealth holdings.  
     
17See Smith (1995)for a development of this argument.  The argument
in the text deals only with bequests and does not speak to the issue
of the role of inter-vivos transfers in creating racial and ethnic
differences in wealth (see Gale-Scholz (1994) for a good discussion of
inter-vivos transfers.
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inheritances (in 1996 dollars) for black households were about $1,000;
for white households about $10,000.  Even if these inheritances were
completely saved so that they show up in current household wealth,
they would account for a small fraction of racial wealth differences
documented in Table 12. Similarly, two thirds of all white households
and 90 percent of all minority households had received no financial
inheritances by their mid-fifties.  Racial disparities in wealth would
be almost the same if we subtracted out that part of current wealth
derived from past financial inheritances.
17 
If not financial inheritances, then all we have left is people
saving at different rates from their income and/or experiencing
different ex-post rates of return on their savings.  The first
question then becomes why African-American and Hispanic households
save so much less than white households do.  This is a much under-
researched question partly due to the lack of adequate data.  Because
wealth disparities far exceed those in income, there has been some
thought that the reasons must lie in some unique historical events
specific to the African-American or the immigrant experience.  For
blacks, it is sometimes argued that a culture promoting savings was52
not encouraged or was to difficult to develop.  However, the data
presented in Figure 11 suggest that it is premature to jump to race
and ethnic specific explanations. 
Once again, the reason lies in a concave relation between savings
or wealth and household income. This non-linear relation between
savings and income explains a good deal of the large racial wealth
discrepancies.  While vastly less than the average white, wealth of
the median black is actually quite similar to whites with the same
income.  In 1994,white households with incomes equal to the median
black household lie at the 25
th percentile of the white income
distribution.  If we compare wealth of the median black to the 25
th
percentile white, their wealth levels are quite similar. When the non-
linearity is taken into account, income explains a good deal of racial
differences in wealth. If low savings behavior is not a racial or
ethnic issue, the unanswered question is why low and middle income
people save so little no matter what their race or ethnic background. 
Different racial groups may also experience different ex-post
rates of return to their past savings which may expand or contract
wealth differences between them.  For example, the recent surge in the
stock market during the last fifteen years increased the wealth of
those households with greater amounts of stock market holdings.  Since
rates of stock ownership and holdings were larger among white
households, wealth of white households would have increased more than
wealth of black households. 53
This dismissal of financial inheritances as an important source
of racial differences in household wealth does not imply that all
forms of inter-generational transmission are unimportant.  For
example, the inheritance of human capital is another source of inter-
generational transmission that clearly creates racial and ethnic
differences in income.  Indeed, one important form in which these
differences in inheritances of human capital show up are the education
differences that were discussed earlier.   
The second factor distorting racial wealth comparisons is that
household wealth represents only part of the wealth households have at
their disposal.  Despite its widespread use, household wealth ignores
large components of wealth that are critical to many households.  For
example, a household's future expected social security benefits are a
lifetime annuity which can be discounted to give a present value of
social security wealth.  In a similar vein, private pensions, either
directly in defined contribution plans or indirectly for defined
benefit plans, are an important source of wealth for many households
especially in their pre-retirement and post-retirement years.
Virtually all households in their fifties anticipate social security
benefits when they retire, and more than half of them are counting on
income from their pensions. When discounted to the present, these
expected income flows translate into considerable wealth. 
Table 12 demonstrates how large they actually are for families
with one member aged 51-61. Mean household, social security, and54
pension wealth are listed in this table.  The widely used conventional
wealth concept hides half of the iceberg as combined social security
and pension wealth are as important as household wealth. Total wealth
is half a million dollars instead of the quarter of a million in
conventional household wealth. More important, the distortion caused
by conventional wealth is much larger among minority families. Among
blacks and Hispanics, conventional household wealth is less than a
third of total wealth.  For minority households, social security
wealth represents the largest part of their wealth. If the enlarged
total wealth concept is used, black households have 46% as much as
white households do compared to 30% for household wealth alone.
Table 12
Wealth by Source (000 of dollars)
_____________________________________________________________________
Household Social Pensions Total
Wealth Security
_____________________________________________________________________
White 264 124 109 503
Black 72 94 65 231
Hispanic 80 94 39 218
_____________________________________________________________________
Source:  Smith (1995).
Conclusions
This paper has covered some wide territory in describing the major
trends that have impacted on the economic position of African-
Americans and Latinos.  In addition to long term trends which appear
to be influenced mostly by skill related factors, I have also
evaluated alternative explanations for the recent stagnation in the
economic position of minority households. These explanations included55
changing schooling, quality of students, affirmative action, and
rising wage inequality.  In addition, the unique role of immigration
in changing the labor market position of Latino workers was evaluated. 
Long-term trends in the relative economic status of Blacks and
Latinos appear mainly to reflect long-term trends in their relative
skills. For example, relative income differences and education
deficits of Blacks compared to whites are quite closely related. For
Latinos, it is also necessary to distinguish between immigrants and
the native-born. The slow rate of Hispanic educational and economic
progress largely reflects a changing composition of the immigrant
workforce. The rising fraction of immigrants in the Hispanic male work
force in recent decades slowed the aggregate gains in Hispanic
schooling.
Until the mid-1970s, schooling continued to assume its historical
role as the primary determinant of the male racial wage gap. However,
male education differences by race cannot account for the timing and
magnitude of the male racial stagnation of the last twenty-five years.
Moreover, there is little evidence that the ‘quality’ of black or
Latino students entering the labor market during the last few decades
has declined. Nor can schooling account for the impressive narrowing
of the gender wage gap of the last few decades. However, the
stagnation and decline in Latino wages relative to native-born whites
is consistent with the apparent lack of relative education progress of
the average Latino worker. In addition, affirmative action lead to56
permanent changes in the location of minority employment and produced
significant early jumps in the wages of African-American men. However,
these wages gains proved to be temporary.
The bulk of the remaining stagnation in minority group wages in the
since the mid 1970s is due principally to the rising wage inequality
in the labor market.  Since minority workers skills place them in the
lower part of the wage distribution, increasing wage dispersion across
skill levels will decrease their wages by more than majority workers.
The last twenty years were actually a time during which the slowing
evolving historical forces continued to close the wage gap of black
and white male workers. These forces were simply overwhelmed by the
structural shift of rising wage dispersion.
Due to central role immigration plays in the Latino population,
some additional factors are relevant when discussing their changing
economic status.  First, the well-documented decline in wages of new
Latino immigrants appears to reflect three forces- a growing skill gap
reinforced by an expanding wage gap(conditional on a given skill gap),
and possibly an increasing fraction of undocumented Mexican immigrants 
among all recent immigrants in recent Census and CPS surveys. Second,
across their careers in the United States, wages of Latino immigrants
appear to hold steady relative to the white native-born majority. 
However, Mexican immigrants appear not to do as well over their
careers as immigrants from other ethnic groups. There is no consensus
explanation about why this is so.  Third, at least based on the57
historical record, fears about Latino generational assimilation appear
to be unwarranted as second and third generation Hispanic men have
made considerable strides in narrowing their education and economic
disparities with native white men.
Finally, I document in this paper that racial differences in
household wealth are extremely large; much larger in fact than racial
differences in income. However, in spite of these large racial
disparities, the reasons for these large wealth disparities are
unlikely to have been produced by factors that are specific to
individual racial or ethnic groups. Instead, the reason appears to
arise from the more general tendency of low income households-of
either race- to engage in little savings behavior. Since there are
more African-American or Hispanic than white households in the low
income group, racial and ethnic differences in household wealth will
be large.58
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Male Wage Growth 1970-1990
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Figure 8a
Adjusted Hispanic Wage Growth 1970-1990
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New Immigrant Cohorts from Mexico























































































1984 Wealth Distribution: Percentiles 1 to 50 (1996 Dollars)
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